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Abstract 
Through an interview based study this thesis investigates how MiFID II, a new EU directive 
concerning the European Union’s financial markets, will affect the principal-agent 
relationship currently present between financial advisors and retail investors. Our sample 
consist of twelve representatives from Sweden’s major banks, product manufacturers, and 
consultancy firms, all with a solid understanding of the Swedish financial advisory scene. Our 
interview results suggest that MiFID II will have a limited effect on the business model of 
financial advisors, at least in the short-term. However, increased transparency and new 
product governance requirements will enable retail clients to put pressure on their advisor and 
align the interest of the advisors to the clients’ interest, thus decreasing the principal-agent 
problem. 
Key Words: MiFID II, Financial Advisory, Business Model, Agency Theory, Principal-Agent 
Problems, Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, a paradigm shift has occurred; governments have shifted the responsibility 
of pension plans from authorities on to the individual. Combined with a longer life expectancy 
this change has forced retail investors to take on more responsibility to ensure their financial 
comfort (OECD, 2013). All over the world, retail investors seek advice from finance 
professionals to ensure that this responsibility is managed in the most suitable way. It is likely 
that retail investors are doing so since they feel incapable to manage their wealth in an 
optimal way themselves, due to a limited confidence and knowledge about the financial 
markets (Collins, 2010). Retail investors’ lack of financial knowledge has given financial 
advisors a key role to play in the long-term wealth of the individual (OECD, 2013).  
A financial advisor possesses more knowledge about the financial markets and available 
securities than retail investors and thereby performs a brokerage function on behalf of the 
retail investor by matching the investor with suitable securities based on the investor’s needs 
(Greenbaum, Thakor, & Boot, 2015). In return for providing this service, the advisor charges 
a fee. This fee is typically included in either the management fee1 or in the brokerage2 (Ibid). 
Ideally, the advisor makes the retail investor achieve a higher return than his/hers 
benchmarking index3, net of fees, so both the investor and the advisor become better off 
(Ibid). 
The typical business model, namely how a firm generates value to its stakeholders 
(Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010), of financial advisors can be characterised as a 
freemium model. In a freemium model, the customer receives a service for free but must pay 
a subscription fee for other, more advanced services (Kumar, 2014). In financial advisory, 
retail investors get advice from their financial advisor free of charge. In exchange for 
providing this service, the advisor is remunerated through the fee of the product. Either 
through the fees generated by the advisor’s firm’s products or through a kickback paid by a 
third-party product manufacturer (Thévenoz, 2007).  
The business model of financial advisors is interlinked with the business model of product 
manufacturers, and the two are often combined. A product manufacturer constructs products 
by, for instance, managing one or several funds which retail and institutional investors can 
invest in. The decision of retail clients to purchase the product is often based on the advice of 
                                                          
1 The fee which the product manufacturer charges the investor for investing in their product. 
2 The up-front fee the investor pays to purchase a security. 
3 In this case the benchmarking index refers to the return the retail investors would have achieved by themselves 
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a financial advisor. The different market participants can be distinguished as integrated or 
standalone actors (Gainor, 2017). Integrated actors possess both a distribution channel 
through its network of financial advisors and product manufacturing through their associated 
product manufacturing departments. A standalone player on the other hand, possesses only 
one of the two channels which integrated actors possess, either as a distributor or a 
manufacturer (Ibid). The Swedish market is dominated by vertically integrated banks which 
provide both financial advisory and manufactures products (Finansinspektionen, 2015).   
In Sweden, the universal banks are responsible for more than 80% of all financial advice to 
retail investors (Nilsson & Falk, 2015). However, the banks only manage 59% of the capital 
committed to funds in the country, which is lower than the corresponding figure of 1999 
(Ibid). This is partly related to a system called open architecture which has developed during 
the past decade (Shaughnessy, 2009). Open architecture means that a vertically integrated 
distributor’s product offering includes their own as well as external products (Ibid). When 
distributing the product of an external product manufacturer, the distributor generates revenue 
through a kickback paid from the third-party, as illustrated in figure one. The kickback can be 
provided either as a percentage of the brokerage paid by the client or as a trailer fee based on 
the management fee (Thévenoz, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Problem Discussion 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two main revenue streams for financial advisors, 
the management fee and the kickback. The management fee covers both the cost of advice as 
well as the cost of manufacturing and managing the product (Securities and Exchange 
Commissions, 2017). However, the margin earned by an advisor might be different from 
product to product, which might incentivise an advisor to promote some internal products 
more than they should do based on the product’s characteristics (Finansinspektionen, 2015). 
The same problem occurs with external products if the kickback from one product 
manufacturer is higher than the kickbacks paid by other manufactures since it incentivises the 
Payment  
Kickback 
Payment  
Retail Investor Financial advisor Product 
manufacturer 
Figure 1: In the open architecture system, the advisor is remunerated through a kickback from the 
product manufacturer. 
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advisor to distribute products from that product manufacturer (Ibid). Thus, it is clear that the 
business model which financial advisors operates under today has several inherent conflicts of 
interest since higher margins and commissions for the advisor tend to be associated with 
higher costs for the retail investor (Peck, 2011). Due to the information advantage possessed 
by the advisor (agent), the advisor can capitalise on the, generally, uninformed retail investor 
(principal) to benefit themselves, which causes a classical principal-agent relationship (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Thus, the different margins and kickbacks received by the advisor might 
be detrimental to retail investors if the advisors try to promote the highest paying products 
rather than products that are in the clients’ best interest (Peck, 2011). In the best of all worlds, 
the advisors’ interests would be perfectly aligned with the investors’, which would mitigate 
such a situation.  
As of 2015, almost all financial advice in Sweden was financed by commissions 
(Finansinspektionen, 2015). Due to the reasons mentioned above, which may induce the 
intermediary to give advice based on how much kickbacks each product generates rather than 
how suitable they are for the client, the regulator deems this as problematic since it may create 
an adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970; Finansinspektionen, 2015). Mahoney (2004) 
illustrates that the total expense ratio, the cost of a fund, is negatively correlated with 
investor’s return. Empirical evidence from the US shows that standalone advisors prefer to 
sell expensive funds which generate high fees and thus decrease investor returns 
(Bhattacharya, Hackethal, Kaesler, Loos, & Meyer, 2012). This implies that the principal-
agent problem described above is far from a theoretical problem but rather a problem of 
significant practical importance. Therefore, regulations have been developed around the world 
and especially since the last financial crisis such regulations have become stricter to protect 
investors and hinder advisors from abusing their power (Moshirian, 2011). However, any 
regulation that tries to solve a problem on the financial market must take close consideration 
not to worsen other problems (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012).  
MiFID II is a new regulatory framework that is meant to promote transparency and increase 
the investor protection in the financial markets, which will have major implications for the 
financial advisory sector (ESMA - Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group, 2014). MiFID 
II is partly meant to deal with the conflicts of interests described above and increase the 
quality of financial advice (ESMA, 2014). Per MiFID II, independent advisors will no longer 
be able to accept any kickbacks, except minor non-monetary benefits, and must therefore 
develop a new payment model, while non-independent advisors must disclose all their fees 
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and kickbacks to the client (European Commission, 2016). These changes will thus challenge 
financial advisors to find a suitable business model by which they can both comply with the 
regulation and motivate the fee to the clients when the transparency increases. 
However, it is unclear how these changes will affect the principal-agent problems associated 
with the current business model of financial advisors. For instance, disclosure of received 
kickbacks might cause vertically integrated actors to promote more of their own products 
rather than external products (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012), which does not ameliorate the 
principal-agent problem. MiFID II may also induce other changes to the business model of 
financial advisors and the effects of MiFID II for the principal-agent relationship between 
financial advisors and retail investors is yet to be explored.   
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the implementation of MiFID II will affect 
the conflicts of interest arising from the information asymmetry in the financial advisory or 
not and, if so, how it will change. Our research question is thus,  
What effects will MiFID II have on the business model of financial advisors and what 
will these effects imply for the principal-agent relationship between financial advisors 
and retail investors?  
By researching this question, we will contribute to current research since the area lacks prior 
research, give an early policy evaluation to the regulators as well as a finding of practical 
importance. Our results have practical significance since one of the main targets of the MiFID 
II regulation is to increase the consumer protection in the financial markets, if we find that 
this is unlikely to be fulfilled with MiFID II the industry can expect and prepare for yet 
another round of regulation.   
1.3 Delimitations and Disposition 
Financial markets are highly dependent on the institutional environment they exist in, just 
within Europe are there many differences in conditions and how the markets functions (ECB, 
2012). Due to market heterogeneity, conclusions drawn in one national setting might not be 
valid for another. Therefore, we have limited our research to the Swedish market. 
Furthermore, the principal-agent relationship is mainly affected by the parts of MiFID II that 
apply to the relationship between financial intermediaries and retail investors, which is why 
we have chosen to focus our research on these areas of the regulation.  
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The rest of this thesis is organised as follows; Section two briefly explains the characteristics 
of financial advisory on the Swedish market and gives a high-level overview of MiFID II. 
Section three introduces principal-agent theory which is at the heart of our study. Section four 
explains the methods used in the study and discusses the study’s weaknesses. In section five 
we present our interview results which are then analysed and discussed in section six, section 
seven concludes the thesis while section eight introduces proposals for further research. 
2. Setting the Scene 
The Swedish financial advisory scene is dominated by the big domestic universal banks, 
Nordea, Swedbank, Svenska Handelsbanken, SEB, and their associated product 
manufacturing departments (Nilsson & Falk, 2015). The universal banks which today have 
strong positions in the financial advisory market, also have a strong position within the 
product provision market. That is mainly due to their extended network of retail branches in 
which they hold a natural distribution channel to retail investors (Klaus, 2016).  
Through their extensive branch network the universal banks mentioned above serves a wide 
client spectrum with investors in many different shapes, regarding both their wealth level and 
legal entity. The first distinction is often if the investor is an institution or a private person 
(UBS Group AG, 2016). Furthermore, the wealth level plays a key role; individuals are often 
segmented either as ordinary retail investors or Private Banking customers. Retail investors 
often use their “personal banker” at the local branch office, which offers advice on what 
products that fits the retail investor’s profile and needs. In Sweden, Private Banking clients 
are often defined as clients with at least five million SEK in investable assets (Nordea, 2017). 
When a retail investor reaches this wealth level, the client is entitled to utilise the Private 
Banking services their advisor offer if they wish (Greenbaum, Thakor, & Boot, 2007). Private 
Banking clients are eligible for a wider product assortment and more services compared to 
ordinary retail clients (Ibid) 
During the last decades, increasingly more retail investors have shifted their savings to 
discretionary investment management (EFAMA, 2015), even though discretionary mandates 
still are used mainly by wealthy individuals (Picardo, 2017). In discretionary investment 
management, the advisor becomes a portfolio manager for the savings with a mandate to buy 
and sell products as they see fit. Outside of discretionary mandates, clients must give their 
advisor an order to buy or sell a product before the advisor can act (Handelsbanken Asset 
Management, n.d) 
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2.1 MiFID II at a glance 
Since the foundation of the European Union in 1958, the economic collaboration between the 
member states has been in focus. One of the main focuses of the EU during the past years has 
been the creation of a well-functioning single market (EU, 2016). As a part of this effort, the 
first version of the MiFID regulation was implemented across the Union in 2007 with the aim 
of creating a single capital market and union-wide consumer protection for financial services 
(ESMA, 2017). The 3rd of January 2018 MiFID I will be replaced by MiFID II and MiFIR, 
which is a regulatory framework that combines both a directive with regulation. MiFID II will 
be implemented the aim to improve and further harmonise the financial markets within the 
Union by promoting transparency and increasing investor protection in the financial markets 
(ESMA, 2014). The regulation is comprehensive and will have a widespread impact; this 
thesis will not discuss all elements of MIFID II in detail. However, to set the scene, we will 
provide a high-level overview of the aims with MIFID II as defined by the European 
Commission,  
“MiFID II/MiFIR aim to enhance the efficiency, resilience and integrity of financial markets, 
notably by:  
• Achieving greater transparency: introduction of a pre- and post-trade transparency 
regime for non-equities and strengthening and broadening of the existing equities 
trade transparency regime;  
• Bringing more trading onto regulated venues: creation of a new category of platforms 
to trade derivatives and bonds - the Organised Trading Facilities - and of a trading 
obligation for shares on regulated venues;  
• Fulfilling the Union’s G20 commitments on derivatives: mandatory trading of 
derivatives on regulated venues, introduction of position limits and reporting 
requirements for commodity derivatives, broadening the definition of investment firm 
to capture firms trading commodity derivatives as a financial activity;  
• Facilitating access to capital for SMEs: introduction of the SME Growth Market 
label;  
• Strengthening the protection of investors: enhancement of the rules on inducements, a 
ban on inducements for independent advice and new product governance rules;  
• Keeping pace with technological developments: regulating high-frequency trading 
(HFT) imposing requirements on trading venues and on firms using HFT;  
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• Introducing provisions on non-discriminatory access to trading and post-trading 
services in trading of financial instruments notably for exchange-traded derivatives;  
• Strengthening and harmonizing sanctions and ensuring effective cooperation between 
the relevant competent authorities.  
Finally, the overarching aim of the MiFID II/MiFIR regulatory package is to level the playing 
field in financial markets and to enable them to work for the benefit of the economy, 
supporting jobs and growth.” (European Commision, 2016, s. 2) 
Since we are interested in how the principal-agent relationship in financial advisory will be 
affected, we have chosen to focus on the strengthening of the investor protection and the 
increased transparency MiFID II will bring. The European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), have identified nine changes they think will affect retail investors the most, where 
the first is the classification of independent and non-independent advice. After the 
implementation of MiFID II advisors will need to disclose to an investor whether they are 
providing their advice based on a holistic overview of the universe of securities or a more 
limited universe (ESMA, 2014). To be considered an independent advisor the advice must be 
built on a holistic overview and without any benefits linked to the product, with an exception 
for minor quality enhancing benefits. Thus, independent advisors must reshape their business 
model going forward to compensate for the loss of commission based revenue (Lord, 2013). 
A non-independent advisor on the other hand, will still be able to receive a kickback as long 
as the kickback does not influence their ability to act in the client’s best interest and they can 
show some quality enhancement in their service. However, per MiFID II non-independent 
advisors must clearly explain to the investors on which grounds their advice is non-
independent and the limits to their product assortment (Ibid).  
The other eight changes ESMA have identified are summarised below, 
• Increased transparency of the benefits the advising firm receives by advising the 
investor to buy a certain product. In the future, an advisor must disclose all benefits 
they receive from the product sold. This is valid for both independent and non-
independent advisors.  
• Segmentation of costs and charges. To adhere to MiFID II, an advisor must disclose 
how much they charge in total and segment the total into how much of the total fee the 
investor pays that is for covering the cost of advice and the cost of the instrument 
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respectively. The firm must disclose how much they charge in total in absolute terms 
and not just as a percentage of the invested capital.    
• Increased price transparency. After the implementation of MiFID II firms must 
disclose the prices offered to trade with more securities than today, such as bonds, 
derivatives, Exchange Traded Funds, and so on, on a trading platform.  
• More stringent requirements for firms to provide investors with information before a 
purchase is made. The information must contain information about the costs, the risks, 
and if the product is intended for retail or professional investors. It must also be 
information about whether the product is provided by the firm itself, a related firm, or 
an independent firm.  
• Stricter product governance, after the 3rd of January 2018 investment firms must take 
the best interest of the investor into consideration already in the development of new 
products. That means that a target market for the product must be identified and all 
risks understood already in the development phase. 
• More power to regulators. Per MiFID II the regulators can ban products they deem as 
unsuitable for investors, conditional on several, specific, legal conditions. 
• More products, for instance, structured products, will be classified as complex 
products. The requirements of a firm to assess the client’s knowledge and experience 
before selling complex a product will also be strengthened.  
• When safeguarding assets for a client, a firm can no longer use these assets for their 
own benefit. The firm must also make sure that the assets are secure if a firm fails.  
(ESMA, 2014) 
2.2 Related Regulations 
MiFID II are just one of the many regulations that surround the financial markets 
(Brunnermeier, o.a., 2009). This thesis will not compare MiFID II with other regulations, but 
it is important to have a basic understanding of some of these regulations for the remainder of 
this thesis since we sometimes relate certain effects of MiFID II to these regulations. 
2.2.1 Commission Bans   
Some EU-countries have implemented regulations with similarities to MiFID II regarding 
financial advisory. However, most of them are stricter when it comes to kickbacks (Caceis 
Investor Service & PwC, 2015). The UK regulation is named Retail Distribution Review or 
simply RDR. The RDR states that advisors of investment and pension products no longer can 
receive any kickbacks when advising retail clients. The Dutch regulation is even broader and 
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includes a ban of kickbacks on all products sold to retail investors, including products from 
Execution-Only platforms4 and portfolio management. Furthermore, the Dutch regulation 
lacks the grandfathering clause the RDR possess (Ibid).  
2.2.2 UCITS 
UCITS, an abbreviation of “Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable 
Securities”, is a regulation meant to improve the harmonisation of Europe’s financial markets 
by creating a standard for manufacturing and distribution of investment funds targeting retail 
investors. The EU made a distinction between financial products directed to professional and 
retail investors through the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFM) which 
was implemented in 2013. The AIFM directive covers investment schemes such as Hedge 
Funds, Private Equity Funds and Real Estate Funds, aimed at professional investors, while the 
UCITS-framework covers investment schemes aimed for any investor (European 
Commission, 2017). Since UCITS implementation in 1984, the framework has been updated 
four times, where UCITS IV from 2011 is the latest. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Financial advisors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their clients, however 
since the advisors have diverging interest from their clients, the relationship can be 
characterised as a principal-agent relationship (Peck, 2011). In this chapter, we present 
previous literature about the principal-agent problem in general, and financial advisory in 
particular. The chapter is organised as follows; we start by defining the concept of a principal-
agent relationship and the problems it gives rise to, namely moral hazard and adverse 
selection, before discussing the issue in the context of financial advisory. We then present 
solutions to the principal-agent problem, while finishing the section with a presentation about 
our analytical framework.     
3.1 The Principal-Agent Relationship 
A principal-agent conflict materialises when there is a separation of the control of a decision 
and the ownership of the outcome (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). In the theory of corporate 
finance, this is often researched in situations where the ownership and control of a firm are 
separated, but the concept has many more applications. Research of the principal-agent 
                                                          
4 An Execution-Only platform is a platform where retail investors can invest in securities without preceding 
advice from a financial advisor. 
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conflict within firms will be used to analyse the principal-agent conflict regarding financial 
advisors when applicable in the rest of this study.  
Ross defined a principal-agent relation as follows,  
“… an agency relationship has arisen between two (or more) parties when one designated as 
the agent, acts for, or on behalf of, or as a representative for the other, designated principal, 
in a particular domain of decision problems.” (Ross, 1973, p. 134).  
Jensen and Meckling offer a slightly different but similar definition, 
“We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. If both parties to the 
relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not 
always act in the best interests of the principal.” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). 
A principal-agent relation occurs to most of us frequently in our everyday life. For instance, a 
customer faces a principal-agent conflict every time he/she goes to the grocery story since the 
seller knows better than the client if the apple is organic or not. Furthermore, the customer 
and the store owner has conflicting interests. The customer wants to pay as little as possible 
for the apple while the seller wants to get paid as much as possible. However, principal-agent 
problem in these situations is often deemed irrelevant (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). Much of 
the theory is instead focused on situations where the task is too complicated for the principal 
to conduct on his/her own and is, therefore “forced” to hire an agent to solve the task 
(Sappington, 1991). In situations where the principal-agent problem is researched the 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent tend to be more severe than in 
“daily situations.” 
At the heart of the principal-agent conflict lies the problem of asymmetric information. 
Asymmetric information means that the agent has access to better, or more, information than 
the principal, which might be the very reason to why the principal is using the agent (Ross, 
1973). As Jensen and Meckling (1976) points out in their definition, a principal-agent 
relationship might be detrimental to the principal if the agent is a utility maximiser, since the 
agent will try to maximise his/her utility at the principal’s expense whenever he/she can. 
Thus, there is a conflict of interest between the agent and the principal. The conflict of interest 
arises since the principal and the agent does not have the same utility function which causes 
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them to strive for different objectives (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). This gives rise to what in 
agency theory is called agency costs, in other words the loss the principal suffers from 
outsourcing some decision-making authority to the agent. The principal’s loss occurs since it 
is impossible to design a contract that perfectly aligns the interests of the principal and the 
agent, thus the principal suffers the residual loss (Peck, 2011). In general, there are two types 
of problems arising from the information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2012).  
3.1.1 Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection occurs before a contract is signed and tells us something about which 
products that will be available on the market. A common way to explain adverse selections is 
as a lemons problem, which is how the Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof portrayed the 
problem. Akerlof’s reasoning is illustrated with the following example, there are two types of 
cars in the world, good and bad, and the car owner knows which type of car he possesses but a 
potential buyer cannot distinguish between the two. Thus, there is an information asymmetry 
between buyer and the seller. Since the purchaser cannot differentiate between the two types 
of cars, he will offer the vendor a weighted average of the price of good and bad cars, 
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 + 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑠. 
Since the owners of the car knows which type of car they possess, only the owners of bad cars 
will sell their cars at the offered price. By this mechanism, only bad cars will be available on 
the market. (Akerlof, 1970) 
3.1.2 Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard, sometimes also described as hidden action, takes place post contract. A moral 
hazard occurs when the principal cannot observe the actions of the agent, which enable the 
agent to take actions that is in his/her best interest but not in the best interest of the principal. 
In such a setting, the agent may be flying a corporate jet to a major business meeting just as 
well as to a family vacation. Even if the principal might observe some indications of the 
behaviour there is no way they can determine which case it is. (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012)  
3.2 Principal-Agent Conflicts within Financial Advisory 
Since different products generate different margins and commission to a financial advisor, as 
described in the problem discussion, financial advisors find themselves in a multitasking 
problem. On one hand, the advisor should give suitable advice to the retail investor, but on the 
other hand, the advisor has incentives to sell the securities that generate maximum revenue for 
his employers and thus maximises the agent’s benefits (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009; Peck, 
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2011). This is a problem since financial advisors are rational and want to maximise their 
profit while they should act in the best interest of individuals who wants to maximise their 
capital (Ibid). The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority points out that the multitasking 
problem occurs both when the firm sells their own products, due to differences in the margins 
of products, and when the firm makes money out of commissions paid by other product 
manufacturers (Finansinspektionen, 2015). This conclusion is also supported by Inderst and 
Ottaviani (2009). Therefore, by seeking advice of a financial intermediary and typically 
trusting this advice without conducting a thorough background check (Chater, Huck, & 
Inderst, 2010) retail investors are exposing themselves to a substantial risk of being trapped in 
a suboptimal position by accepting to pay a higher than optimal fee (Mullainathan, Nöth, & 
Schoar, 2012). The suboptimal situation can occur since the financial literacy possessed by 
the average retail investor is significantly lower than the literacy possessed by the financial 
advisor. The financial intermediary, the agent, knows more about the universe of potential 
securities and the suitability of these securities than the retail investor (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2008; Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009). Furthermore, the agent knows more about how much 
commission/margin each product generates than the customer (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009).  
Golec (1992) also defined the relationship between an investor and investment advisor as a 
principal-agent relationship. The investor hires the investment advisor to supply investment 
information, implying a brokerage function of the advisor. To which extent the advisor fulfils 
the brokerage function is not directly observed by the investor. Instead, the investor observes 
the information in terms of excess portfolio return (Ibid). Since monitoring is costly for the 
principal, the advisor has no incentive to provide information to the portfolio unless the 
advisor has some other incentive to do so, in example via a compensation contract. For 
financial advisors, the fee is typically a percentage of the fund’s asset under management 
charged at the end of each year, which provide some incentive to maximise the investor’s 
return since the fee will be higher if the advisor generates a positive return (Ibid).  
3.3 Solutions to Agency Conflicts 
There are mechanisms to limit the agency cost that the principal must bear. One of the most 
popular methods to do so is to monitor the agent, which reduces the information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent, and forces the agent to act in the client’s interest 
(Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). However, monitoring is costly and might be incomplete, which 
limits the usability in monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Golec (1992) mentioned that 
due to their limited amount of capital monitoring is a relatively costly action for mutual fund 
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investors in general, which is why they often does not monitor their advisor. When it comes to 
monitoring, regulation plays a significant role as well. Regulation will act both as a limitation 
to the agent’s available options and as monitoring since the regulators will observe the actions 
of the firms to make sure that they only conduct measures that are within the law (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). Furthermore, due to reputational concerns of the agent, the media have an 
important role to play when it comes to monitoring (Dyck, Volchkova, & Zingales, 2008). By 
acting in a non-optimal way for clients, a corporation can attract unpleasant attention from the 
media. On the other hand, the media is far from perfect and quite often target the wrong cases 
and individuals (Ibid). Another solution for the principal-agent problem is to align the agent’s 
interest with the principal’s by sharing some risk and profit with the agent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In the long run, and under efficient markets, competition will be another key 
component in reducing the principal-agent problems, for instance through price competition 
(Nickel, 1996) and benchmark opportunities (Hart, 1983), since bad firms will be driven out 
of the market (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012).  
A possible method to mitigate the agency costs associated with third party distribution is 
mandatory disclosure of the commissions paid to the agents (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009). Peck 
(2011) argues that disclosure of the benefits received by a product improves investment 
managers’ execution of their fiduciary duty in two ways. First, by disclosure, it is harder for 
the investment manager to hide conflicting interests, which lowers the agent’s monitoring 
cost. Second, it enables the client to identify competing interests. However, disclosure might 
be insufficient if the clients do not think that they will suffer from the disclosed fees 
(Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, & Tufano, 2011).  
Since retail investors often is quite naive, regulators must be careful to make sure all conflict 
of interests is disclosed and not just the external agency problem when trying to regulate 
kickbacks (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012). For instance, by forcing a distributor to disclose all 
commissions received, the regulation might benefit vertically integrated actors who do not 
receive any commissions but still has potential agency conflicts (Ibid). Therefore, any 
regulation trying to mitigate this problem must, therefore, consider both the positive and the 
negative aspects of commissions. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) predicts that disclosure of 
commissions will decrease the level of commissions received, they also note that the 
disclosure of commissions might make retail clients unable to absorb other, pay-off relevant, 
facts. If the disclosure makes advisors more tied to a specific set of products, for instance, the 
products of one manufacturer, this might force clients to visit more advisors to obtain a 
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complete picture of available securities (Ibid). However, Inderst & Ottaviani (2012) argues 
that increased transparency in financial advisory should improve the quality of the service by 
market forces. 
3.4 Analytical Framework 
The literature presented above describes why a principal-agent relationship might be 
detrimental to the principal’s interest. In this chapter, we have shown that a principal-agent 
relationship materialises when there is a separation of the ownership, of the outcome, and 
control, of the decision (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Due to the asymmetric 
information between the agent and the principal, this gives rise to agency costs (Thomsen & 
Conyon, 2012). The key agency costs a principal-agent relationship gives rise to is adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Ibid). In the financial advisory sector, these costs materialise 
since the agent has incentives to distribute the product which generates the highest revenue to 
the agent. This incentive might cause a situation where retail investors face an adverse 
selection problem since they are mainly offered overpriced products (Finansinspektionen, 
2015; Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012; Akerlof, 1970). Furthermore, the chapter has introduced 
solutions, and their associated drawbacks, to the principal-agent problem, such as monitoring, 
alignment of interests, and competition (Thomson & Conyon, 2012; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Ross, 1973). In the rest of this thesis, the theoretical knowledge will allow us to identify 
agency problems in financial advisory, and predict how MiFID II will influence these 
problems. By applying this understanding in a context with our interview results and the 
effect of the commission ban in the Netherlands and the UK, we will analyse the effect of 
MiFID II on the principal-agent relationship in financial advisory, as illustrated in figure two. 
Through this framework, we also answer our research question. 
 
Figure 2: The analytical framework of the study 
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4.  Method 
Since the principal-agent problem is hard to measure, it is necessary to explore how and why 
MiFID II will affect the business model of financial advisors to thereby see how the principal-
agent relationship between financial advisors and retail investors will develop in the new 
narrative. To answer the how and why questions this thesis employs a qualitative research 
method since it is the best way to, 
” ... opening the black box" of organisational processes, the "how", "who" and "why" of 
individual and collective organised action as it unfolds over time in context” (Doz, 2011, s. 
583) 
The use of a qualitative method is further motivated by the fact that MiFID II is not yet 
implemented which means that there is no quantitative data about its effect available. In the 
following section, we describe which qualitative methods we have used to answer our 
research question in more detail. At first, we discuss the structure of our interviews, followed 
by a discussion about our sampling method and a short paragraph of why we have used 
observations from the Netherlands and the UK in our analysis. The section also includes a 
description of our data analysis and concludes with a section with critique of the chosen 
method.   
4.1 Interviews 
When conducting an interview, one can choose to either have a structured, semi-structured or 
unstructured interview. However, structured interviews are mainly used in quantitative 
interviews (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Unstructured interviews are often similar to a regular 
conversation, at most the researcher bring some brief notes about the topic, lets the 
conversation flow freely and, mainly listens to the interviewed (Ibid). A more commonly used 
method of interviewing is the semi-structured interview. In a semi-structured interview, the 
researcher brings an interview guide with predetermined but open-ended questions (DiCicco-
Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). When conducting a semi-structured interview, the researcher must 
be careful not to “get stuck” with the interview guide and be alert and ask follow-up questions 
to capture what the interviewed views as important (Ibid). In the interview guide the first 
question might be the overall research questions, but at least five-ten smaller/more specific 
questions should be added. As the process goes on it, is not uncommon to change the 
questions somewhat over time as the researcher learns more about the subject (Ibid). We used 
semi-structured interviews for this thesis since it provided the necessary structure for our 
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interviews which had specific topics we wanted to investigate. At the same time, the semi-
structured interviews provided us with flexibility to modify the questions, based on what the 
respondents viewed as important and as we developed our knowledge. 
4.2 Sampling 
In a qualitative study, the group of respondents is not a sample in the same sense as in a 
quantitative study and normal sampling rules, for instance, random sampling, are not 
applicable. On the contrary, the respondents should be quite homogenous and chosen based 
on their knowledge of the matter at hand to ensure depth and richness of data (DiCicco-Bloom 
& Crabtree, 2006). To fulfil these requirements, we have chosen our sample on theoretical 
grounds. To choose a sample on theoretical grounds means that the researcher has an idea 
about the topic he/she wants to study and then chooses a group of individuals to interview 
based on their knowledge on the subject (Bryman & Bell, 2011). When sampling on 
theoretical grounds, the researcher cannot decide beforehand how many interviews that will 
be conducted (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The researcher must continue to collect data until the 
topic is saturated with new information. A topic is saturated when no new or relevant data 
about a category is discovered, the category is well developed regarding its characteristics and 
variation, or if the relations between the categories have been well established (Ibid). To 
achieve saturation, we conducted twelve interviews of one hour with fifteen individuals who 
have insight into the Swedish financial advisory scene. These interviews gave us a holistic 
view of the chosen topic, and no new information about the identified concepts was identified 
in the later interviews. 
For this thesis, representatives from all Sweden’s four universal banks, smaller product 
manufacturers, more recent entrants such as an online broker, as well as consultants from 
some of the world’s most renowned consultancy firms were interviewed. All respondents 
were granted anonymity in the thesis but a list of the functions our respondents held at the 
time of the interview is provided in the appendix. The interviews were recorded if the 
respondent did not oppose such a procedure. In total, nine out of the twelve interviews were 
recorded. Due to the level of the thesis, the interviews were not transcribed, except for the 
used quotations.  
4.3 Benchmarking to the Netherlands and the UK  
To put our interview results in a context and predict effects we sometimes draw parallels to 
the developments in the Netherlands and UK after the implementation their commission bans. 
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By using cases where similar regulations have been implemented, we enable ourselves and 
the respondents to answer how and why questions about the outcome of an intervention 
(Goodrick, 2014). However, we have only used benchmarking data when such information 
was mentioned during the interviews and we do not, in any way, attempt to conduct a full 
comparative case study.   
4.4 Data Analysis 
The field of data analysis might be the weakest point of a qualitative study since the 
conventions of how to analyse qualitative data are far from as pronounced as they are for 
quantitative data (Miles, 1979). We will handle our data with an approach inspired by 
grounded theory which is the most common way of analysing qualitative data (Ibid). We 
followed the key steps in grounded theory which are described below.  
In grounded theory, an essential component is that the findings from the first interview are 
challenged, and used to direct, the following interviews, which is why our data analysis 
started as soon as any data had been collected. By doing so, the researcher can be sure to 
capture all the relevant aspects of the topic at the same time as biases can be avoided since 
each aspect discovered in one interview is tested in the next (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). When 
handling the data after an interview, the researcher should look for concepts and give these 
concepts different labels and try to fit concepts from later interviews to existing labels. If no 
suitable label exists a new label must be created (Ibid).  
When concepts have been identified, similar concepts can be grouped together as a more 
general grouping takes place, namely categories. However, for a category to be defined, one 
must identify and specify under which conditions the category is valid. Over time many 
categories can be shaped and related to each other and then a theory of a phenomenon can be 
formed. As noted in the first paragraph, previous findings should constantly be challenged 
with new discoveries to avoid biases and improve the precision of the grouping. What initially 
could have been considered as one concept might be split into two or more sub-concepts of 
the first. Regularities and irregularities must become apparent in the grouping of the data. If 
some behaviour is the norm but changes under certain conditions, this variation must be 
accounted for in the analysis (Ibid). 
To identify the concepts, the researcher must code the data. The coding process consist of 
three different stages, open, axial, and selective coding (Ibid) which corresponds to different 
levels of coding (Bryman & Bell, 2011). In the first stage, open coding, the data is broken 
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down into small pieces that are then clustered together and rephrased to concepts and 
categories. After this process, the axial coding takes place in which connections between the 
categories are explored by examining links and causality between the concepts. The final 
stage is the selective coding whereas the main category is identified and the other concepts are 
related to this category (Bryman & Bell, 2011; Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  
4.5 Critique against Chosen Method 
Even though grounded theory is a well-researched method for qualitative research, it has 
several flaws (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Validity and reliability are two key concepts when 
evaluating a study, which is often used in similar applications in qualitative and quantitative 
studies (Ibid). Reliability refers to the opportunity for another researcher to replicate the study 
with the same result. Validity, in many aspects the most important criteria (Ibid), refers to the 
study’s ability to reach conclusions which accurately represents the reality (Collins & Hussey, 
2009). In this section, we will discuss some weaknesses of our study in the perspective of 
validity and reliability and present what we have done to mitigate the problems.  
4.5.1 Validity  
A weak point of qualitative studies is that there are no formal tests to conduct with the data in 
the analysis phase as in quantitative research. The lack of formal tests makes qualitative 
studies more subject to the researcher’s interpretation and understanding of the data which 
limits the validity, and reliability, of the study (Bryman & Bell, 2011). To mitigate these 
problems, as far as possible, all the observed data was tested and challenged in the remaining 
interviews, as described by Corbin and Strauss (1990). By constantly questioning findings 
from previous interviews, potential biases from ourselves and the respondents were reduced. 
In the report, it has sometimes been necessary to raise topics which were only covered in one 
or a few interviews, in such cases this is made clear by a statement before the finding.    
During our study, we have been unable to interview a respondent from the regulators, which 
is a drawback to the study. It would have been interesting to compare the regulators’ 
interpretation of MiFID II to the market participants’ interpretation. By interviewing a 
representative from a regulator, the regulator's interpretation of the guidelines and in which 
areas they will focus most of their efforts on would have been clarified. However, our sample 
has been chosen on theoretical grounds and includes most categories of actors on the Swedish 
financial advisory scene, including representatives from vertically integrated actors, 
standalone actors, and consultants. Thus, the sample includes most of the actors that will 
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shape the future of financial advisory in Sweden, which is essential for the validity of the 
study. Thereby, aside from the regulator, we have captured a mix of respondents, which has 
enabled us to triangulate the effects of MiFID II. Triangulation is a control mechanism of 
qualitative studies and improves the validity (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  Furthermore, most of 
the respondents described similar effects of MiFID II which is an indication that both the 
validity and reliability of the study is high.  
The respondents have been granted anonymity throughout this thesis, while we are convinced 
that the anonymity has improved the quality of the data, by making the respondents speak 
more freely about the topic, it is understandable if it raises questions about the credibility of 
the study among readers. There is not much we can do to mitigate this problem more than 
once again stress that this has improved the quality of the data and thus, increased the validity 
of the study since the data captures a more accurate representation of the reality.     
In the study, we, and the respondents have sometimes used extrapolation of what happened in 
the Netherlands and the UK to forecast the effects of MiFID II on the Swedish market. Due to 
the heterogeneity in the financial markets (ECB, 2012), the effect of these regulations in these 
markets might not be the same as the effect of MiFID II on the Swedish market. It is also 
important to note that these regulations are not the same as MiFID II, which can further 
worsen the problem of generalising results from one market to another. This heterogeneity 
might make it hard to reach conclusions that are generalisable across markets. To avoid this 
issue, we have mainly used comparisons when discussing isolated effects which should be 
valid across markets.  
4.5.2 Reliability 
Since it does not exist as strict guidelines for qualitative studies, as for quantitative research, 
on how to collect and analyse data, a qualitative study is more dependent of the researcher 
that conducts the study than quantitative studies (Ibid). Due to the different interpretation of 
the data and potential biases of various researchers, it is hard for another researcher to 
replicate the study, which is another limitation to the reliability of this study.  
Another weakness of our study is the fact that MiFID II is an upcoming regulation which has 
not been implemented yet. If the regulators present more, or updated, guidelines for the 
implementation of MiFID II it is possible that our current findings and conclusions will 
become invalid. It is also important to note that the views expressed by the respondents are 
expectations of the future, rather than a description of the past which adds to the insecurity of 
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the study. Furthermore, because the regulation is not implemented yet, we have been unable 
to compare our findings to other papers and observe any discrepancies, which could have 
served as an important control mechanism. Because of this uncertainty, the reliability of our 
study might be challenged if the interpretation of MiFID II changes before or after the 
implementation. In qualitative studies, this is a common issue since the ever-changing 
circumstances in the society might cause another researcher to get other results when trying to 
replicate the results of a study (Bryman & Bell, 2011). However, since MiFID II will be 
implemented only seven months after the publication of this thesis, and the actors need time 
to adjust their business model accordingly, any major changes before the implementation are 
unlikely.  
Once again, we want to stress that this thesis deals with a future event which means that some 
variables might change before the implementation, which might change our conclusions. The 
uncertainty is especially pronounced when the long run effects are discussed, since it is easier 
to predict the state of the world in six months than in several years, due to the ever-changing 
circumstances.   
5. Interview Results  
When reviewing our interview results, we have identified several interesting concepts which 
have been grouped together in categories as described in the method section. In this section, 
each headline represents one identified category. In general, only issues that were brought up 
in most of, many of the interviews are presented. However, to capture different nuances of the 
findings, it is sometimes necessary to present findings only observed in one or two interviews 
as well. In such cases, we clearly express this by stating “as one of the respondents said…” or 
similar before the finding. The section starts with a presentation of the respondents’ thoughts 
of being classified independent or non-independent since the actors’ classification will 
influence the business model of financial advisors. We then continue by presenting two 
processes currently used to avoid potential conflicts of interest before we continue with our 
interview results regarding MiFID II’s effect on the financial advisors’ business model and 
product offering. The section then continues with a presentation of the increased requirements 
regarding product governance and the knowledge level of an advisor before finishing off with 
a presentation of the generally uninterested retail investor.        
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5.1 Classification as Independent or Non-Independent Advice 
With MiFID II, commissions are only forbidden for independent advisors and in discretionary 
mandates (in discretionary mandates the advisor can receive a kickback but must then pass it 
on to the investor). Independent advisors cannot have any product manufacturing and must 
take a holistic view of the universe of securities when giving advice. In the Swedish market, 
the number, and relative size, of independent actors are small, while, according to the 
respondents, it is more common in the UK and the US. The Swedish market is dominated by 
the universal banks which will be classified as non-independent per MiFID II since they, for 
instance, manufactures a part of their product assortment themselves. Smaller actors have the 
opportunity to change their business model to become classified as independent. However, as 
of now, none of the respondents thinks that the competitive advantage of independence will 
be significant enough to incentivise the smaller actors to take a leap into the unknown as a 
change of the business model would mean. Thus, most of the smaller players will be classified 
non-independent as well since it generates the smallest change to the current regime. As a 
whole, the classification of independence can be summarised with the following quote,  
“Depending on the business model one has today, it will be a natural choice; actors that 
manufacture their products will not have the opportunity to be independent. Most likely, a 
majority of actors will choose to be non-independent, at least initially.” 
- Chief Executive Officer, Vertically Integrated Fund Company 
Non-independent advisors will still be able to receive kickbacks if they can provide some 
quality enhancement in their offering and if the kickback does not affect the advisor’s 
fiduciary duty. According to the respondents, it is not well defined by the regulators exactly 
what services that qualify as a quality enhancement. Examples mentioned in the directive are 
a broad range of products (including external products), high accessibility (for instance, via a 
web service that is open 24 hours a day), and continuous feedback on the suitability and 
performance of the advice. It has been made clear by the regulator that just the provision of 
financial advice does not qualify as quality enhancement since advice is the core of the 
business already, or as on respondent put it,  
“To give advice cannot enhance the quality of the advice.” 
-    Group Responsible MiFID II, Universal Bank in Sweden 
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Since most actors will be classified as non-independent by MiFID II, the respondents predict 
that the direct effect on the business model of financial advisors will be limited. However, 
MiFID II also strengthen the documentation needed to prove that each recommendation is 
made in the client’s best interest and not driven by the commission or margin earned. Per 
MiFID II, the advisor must show both the investor and the regulator that the given advice 
recommends the most suitable product to the investor based on the investor’s needs, 
objectives, and characteristics. Two respondents from the major banks pointed out that many 
banks already have processes to manage conflicts of interest but they might need to make 
these processes more pronounced and transparent.   
5.2 Processes to Manage Conflicts of Interests  
As mentioned by the respondents, the Swedish financial advisory scene is dominated by 
universal banks which have inherent conflicts of interest in their business model. The actors 
are aware of these conflicts and have processes in place to mitigate the problem. Two 
methods to manage conflicting interest between an advisor and a client were presented during 
the interviews. The first process brought up by a respondent was a multi-step process. The 
process starts at an “independent” Macro analyst who forecasts how different geographical 
regions, currencies, and interest rates will evolve. The macro analyst is employed by the bank 
but “independent” from the bank since they are compensated based on how accurate forecasts 
they make; thus, their only incentive is to produce as accurate forecasts as possible. In the 
next step, an allocation strategist uses the macro forecast to develop an allocation strategy. 
With this allocation strategy in mind, an investment strategist then chooses an investment 
strategy and proposes suitable funds for the bank’s advisors to recommend to their clients. 
This product offering is then the foundation of each advisory meeting in the bank’s retail 
segment. It is important to note that this strategy is made to fit the retail investors in general, 
but every investor is unique. Therefore, the advisors might need to tweak the strategy to make 
it optimal for each investor. If the advisor chooses to recommend products outside of the 
strategy’s proposed product offering, the advisor must document this, and the rationale for the 
decision. Another respondent from a large bank also brought up the importance of this process 
to avoid conflicts of interests. The respondent also said that due to the new regulation, this 
central governance of advisors might become stricter. By stricter the respondent means that 
the advisor's opportunity to recommend products outside the strategy will become more 
restricted, limiting the flexibility of the advisors.   
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The other process that was presented during the interviews aims to decrease the conflict of 
interest that occurs when a retail investor has bought a fund-in-fund solution. In such 
situations, the bank has incentives to only choose the banks own, expensive, active funds. To 
manage this problem, one of the universal Swedish banks views the fund-in-fund product as a 
part of the professional investment advisory supplied to investors, meaning that the fund 
manager of the fund-in-fund chooses the best funds available in a wide product universe 
including internal, external, active, and passive funds. According to the respondent, this is a 
substantial difference from before when integrated distributors focused solely on internal, 
actively managed, funds in their fund-in-fund products due to the higher revenue generated by 
these products.  
5.3 The Current and Future Business Model 
One of the respondents compared the current business model of financial advisors to how the 
music industry worked before it was disrupted by streaming services such as Spotify and 
Apple Music. Back then, the labels (product manufacturers) owned the artists (products) and 
collected several artists to their stable. The labels then used the artists to put together CDs 
(product offering) which they distributed through a network of distributors, typically physical 
stores (local branches). To incentivise the stores to sell the CDs of a particular label, the labels 
offered to share some of the revenue generated by the CDs with the store owner. These 
incentive schemes made the store owners push certain CDs based on how much revenue they 
got from the specific CD. Thus, not only the quality of the artist decided how many of the 
artist's CDs that were sold. The label’s decision of how much revenue they would share with 
the stores was another key component. According to the respondent, this system obviously 
made customers miss great artists, which is similar to what is happening in the financial 
industry today, where a lot of decent products do not reach retail investors due to the 
distributors’ incentive schemes. 
If the regulators would have outright prohibited kickbacks one of the few respondents that 
supports a complete ban of commissions thinks that the problem, of decent product not 
reaching retail investors, would have been corrected. The respondent is convinced, that if a 
prohibition had taken place, the business model of financial advisors would have changed as 
the music industry developed when the streaming services entered the market. In this 
scenario, financial advisors would act as Spotify to whom the customer pays a continuous fee. 
The advisors would then give advice to the customers based on his/her preferences and what 
other clients in a similar situation seems to like. The product manufacturer would then be 
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remunerated based on how good they are, measured by the amount of capital they attract. 
With this regime, the respondent thinks that fair structures that benefit good products would 
have developed since the best products would generate the highest revenue. On the other 
hand, other respondents argue that this model would severely limit the competition in the 
market since such a system could cause vertically integrated actors to focus their distribution 
solely on their own products. According to the respondents who oppose a ban, the 
consequence of a complete kickback prohibition would have been severely restricted 
distribution opportunities for standalone product manufacturers. 
5.3.1 Structural Changes 
According to the respondents, MiFID II is unlikely to modify the business model of financial 
advisors as drastically as described in the previous paragraphs. However, the increased 
transparency MiFID II will bring, as well as other regulatory changes, will influence the 
business model of financial advisors. According to some of the respondents from the fund 
companies, there might be growing opportunities for standalone product manufacturers to 
distribute their own products on in the future. The respondents expect this to be driven mainly 
by the fact that product manufacturers will be able to provide tax-favourable accounts directly 
on their platform in the future. This is not regulated, nor required, by the EU but in the 
national law and could leave the value chain one step shorter. However, it must be noted that 
retail investors are slow movers, which is why the respondents think that this development is 
unlikely to happen overnight but rather over the next decade. This development will likely 
increase the separation between advice and the products, even in the integrated universal 
banks. When the separation increases, the clients might conduct a stricter evaluation if the 
received advice is worth paying for and whether they provide decent products. In the long run, 
the respondents forecast this development to benefit the best, active and passive, products 
while other products will fall victim for the increased competition.   
The respondents expect the structural changes that are likely to happen over the coming 
decade, and the increased transparency MiFID II brings, to force already established actors to 
change their business model somewhat as well. A scenario for how this change might happen, 
as stated by one of the respondents, can be illustrated by an analogy to what happened with 
flight tickets after the deregulation in the 1990s. Before 1990 a flight ticket was quite 
expensive, at least compared to today’s standard, but everything was included. Today, a 
traveller might need to pay extra for luggage, choosing a seat, and even a cup of coffee. 
According to the respondents, it is not unlikely that we will see a similar system for financial 
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advice in the future. In the long-run, a retail investor might be able to choose whether they 
want no advice, advice at one occasion, or continuous advice, and pay accordingly in a more 
convenient way than today. Due to the increased separation between the products and advice, 
some respondents expect the total expense ratio of funds, the cost of a fund, to decrease but on 
the other hand, the retail investor must pay an advisory fee instead. 
Due to MiFID II, and other trends in the society, the respondents expect new competitive 
advantages to evolve in the long-run. According to the respondents, it is likely that more 
independent advisors will establish themselves in the Nordic market since it might be a 
competitive advantage that is more pronounced after the implementation of MiFID II as seen 
in the following quote,  
“In the long run, is it possible that we will see a growing segment of independent advisors 
since they thereby can create a new competitive advantage.”  
-    Chief Executive Officer, Vertically Integrated Fund Company 
However, as pointed out by one respondent, independent advisors have a short-term 
disadvantage compared to the integrated actors, at least in Sweden, since “pure” advice is 
taxed with VAT while the products themselves, which finance the advice given by the 
universal banks, are not. Additionally, the respondents expect eventual new entrants to focus 
on wealthy individuals with lower price sensitivity due to “ordinary” retail clients’ 
unwillingness to pay for advice. 
5.3.2 Low-cost Alternatives 
Almost all the respondents agree that the increased transparency MiFID II brings will further 
spur the growth of low-cost alternatives such as Execution-Only platforms, passively 
managed products, and robo-advice on the Swedish market based on the experience of the 
Netherlands and the UK. According to the respondents, the drivers to this development are the 
fact that retail clients are unwilling to pay for advice and that the regulation will impose new 
costs on financial advisors, which might make them reluctant to provide advice to retail 
investors without a substantial amount of capital.  
In the UK and the Netherlands, which have prohibited commissions, retail investors with 
limited capital have been observed to be unwilling to pay directly for financial advice. Per 
MiFID II, the cost of counsel can still be included in the management fee/kickback, but the 
advisor must disclose to the client how much of the total fee that is used to finance the advice. 
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According to the respondents, this will make retail investors more aware of the cost, 
especially since the advisor by MiFID II will need to show the total cost in monetary terms 
under different scenarios and not just as a percent of the capital. Several respondents 
mentioned the monetary terms as a fundamental difference in the transparency requirements 
since a significant fraction of retail investors fail to conduct even simple percentage 
calculations according to studies. The respondents expect the increased fee transparency to 
cause more retail investors to choose robo-advisors over personal advisors since advice by 
robo-advisors is cheaper than advice from a personal advisor. It is also worth noting that due 
to the global digitalization trend, this is an already ongoing process but it might be further 
spurred by the implementation of MiFID II. 
One respondent described a robo-advisor as equivalent to an Independent Financial Advisor 
regarding the business model but instead of having a conversation with another human being 
the investor inputs data about time horizon, risk preferences, and so on to a computer 
software, a robot, which then allocates the capital accordingly. A potential negative aspect of 
robo-advisors, as several respondents mention, is how robo-advisors will retrieve updated 
information about an investor’s financial situation. Today, a large bank receives this 
information “for free” since the bank, for instance, knows when the client takes out a 
mortgage and can then adjust the savings accordingly. However, other respondents mentioned 
that other regulations, such as the second Payment Services Directive, might mitigate this 
problem in the future by making more information about the clients’ financial situation 
accessible for robo-advisors and other outsiders.  
According to the respondents, the increased price transparency might also push more clients 
to buy Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) and other passively managed products, which are 
typically cheaper than actively managed products. The respondents forecast this trend to be 
particularly pronounced among independent financial advisors since they do not have any 
incentive to advise a client to buy an expensive fund with a high kickback. The respondents 
also predict that the growth of robo-advisors will spur the growth of ETFs since robo-advisors 
often base their allocation strategy on ETFs. Some respondents also mentioned that ETFs 
might increase in popularity under discretionary mandates since some banks will choose not 
to accept any kickback at all. In such cases, ETFs might be a good alternative, at least in the 
short run, due to the lack of kickback-free mutual funds.  
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5.3.2 Complex Products 
Complex products in general, and structured products in particular, are two areas which will 
be heavily influenced by MiFID II. According to the respondents, structured products, 
typically securities that consist of two or more securities to achieve a certain pay-off profile, 
is one of the product categories that fraudulent actors have maltreated the most historically. 
The respondents explained that the maltreatment has been possible because structured 
products are harder for retail investors to understand and evaluate than plain vanilla products, 
such as stocks and bonds. Furthermore, even though the product might have a lifespan of 
several years, the commission for structured products has typically been paid upfront, which 
has made it profitable to distribute new structured products. Thus, fraudulent advisors have 
had incentives to first sell a structured product to a retail investor, advice the investor to sell 
the product before maturity, and then try to make them buy a new product, which has not been 
in the best interest of the investors as stated by one of the respondents,  
“According to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, you will no longer be able to 
receive Up-Front remuneration. For instance, for a Stock index bond running for three years, 
the distributor receives the entire remuneration immediately. It does not matter if the 
customer sells the instrument before maturity; the distributor has already received the 
compensation. Therefore, selling a new product might be considered as something positive. 
The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority have said that this is to the client’s 
disadvantage.” 
-    Group Responsible MiFID II, Major Universal Bank in Sweden 
According to the respondents, MiFID II improves the investor protection regarding structured 
products mainly by classifying structured products as complex products. Furthermore, the 
regulation increases the investor protection regarding complex products in general through 
several measures. First, more products will be classified as complex and before purchasing a 
complex product all retail clients must undergo an appropriateness test. Due to this change, 
the distributors will be forced to alter the interface of their internet platforms to ensure that 
complex product can be accessed only by clients who have undergone such a test. Second, 
MiFID II strengthens the appropriateness test to ensure that the investor understands how the 
complex product works and which risks it exposes the investor too. In an advisory meeting, 
the opportunity to explain the security for a client who does not understand the product in the 
first place is limited due to the time constraint of the meeting. If an investor does not 
understand the product after the meeting, the advisor must advise against buying the product, 
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even if the client still wants to buy it. Thirdly, by MiFID II distributors of complex products 
can no longer be compensated for the distribution upfront. From January 2018, the distributor 
must be remunerated over the lifespan of the product instead. The respondents expect these 
new changes to decrease the popularity of complex products.  
5.3.3 Product Assortment 
What effects MiFID II will have on advisors’ product assortment was a topic of contradiction 
among the respondents. Since customer will become more aware of how much they pay, some 
respondents argued that MiFID II will increase the price competition in the market. Therefore, 
these respondents argued, having a broad product assortment will be less profitable, causing 
the assortment to decrease. On the other hand, financial advisors that will be classified as non-
independent must prove quality enhancement to be allowed to receive kickbacks from product 
manufactures in the future. As the respondent pointed out, a wide product assortment is one 
potential way of doing this, which could cause the product assortment to increase. For 
instance, a universal Swedish bank lately transformed their fund platform to an open 
architecture platform which might have been partially due to their MiFID II preparations 
according to two of the respondents. Currently, most vertically integrated actors only 
distribute external products in areas they feel unable to provide good products on their own. 
However, according to the respondents, there is still uncertainty regarding the scope the 
product assortment must have to be considered as quality enhancement by the regulator. One 
respondent also mentions that the complete prohibition of kickbacks in discretionary 
mandates might cause discretionary managers to focus more on internal products to maintain 
profitability since they generate higher margins. 
5.3 Product Governance  
MiFID II will bring higher requirements on both manufacturers and distributors product 
governance. The increased requirements will force manufacturers to identify a target market, 
to whom the product is meant for, for each product early in the development process. 
According to the respondents, most serious actors already fulfil these requirements by using 
common sense in the development of new products. Especially for UCITS-funds, the effect of 
the new product governance rules is unlikely to have any major effects since the funds are 
directed to a broad range of clients. However, the respondents mentioned that not everyone 
manages this process in a formal and well-documented way. Thus, the respondents think that 
the main change caused by the product governance requirements will be a more structured 
approach to product development, an increased documentation of the process, and the 
Bachelor Thesis Spring 2017 Johansson, Sebastian 
  Sundén, Johan 
32 
provision of more information to distributors, clients, and regulators. MiFID II also requires 
each product manufacturer to supply each distributor with information about the target market 
for every product. The product manufacturers must also evaluate the chosen distribution 
strategy to ensure that the products are distributed to the intended investors. To monitor the 
distributors and retrieve, and distribute, the necessary information will most likely be a minor 
problem for the universal banks which have plenty of resources to manage such requirements. 
On the other hand, smaller distributors and product manufacturers might be more affected by 
the higher requirements since this process might consume much of their resources. Finally, 
distributors will be forced to review their knowledge and competence to make sure they have 
the necessary skillset to sell a specific product in their distribution channels.  
Another area which will be more affected by the product governance requirements according 
to the industry representatives is complex products. Complex products are more affected by 
the product governance requirements since they are more specialised and directed to a smaller 
target market which, according to the respondents, will limit the distribution possibilities of 
complex products. As seen in the following quote, this is something that the market 
participants have adapted to already,  
“Complex products will most likely decrease in popularity, and to some extent, the actors 
have already adapted to this by selling fewer complex products.” 
-    Head of Fund Products, Vertically Integrated Fund Company 
However, as a part of a portfolio, complex products might still be applicable for a client 
outside its target market. The distributor can sell a product outside the target market, without 
discouraging the client, but only if a specific product is deemed a good fit for the investors’ 
portfolio according to the client’s needs, objectives, and characteristics. 
5.4 Product Prohibition 
After the implementation of MiFID II in January 2018, regulators will be able to ban 
investment products they find inappropriate to a greater extent. According to the respondents, 
a product can be inappropriate in multiple ways; it can either be outright bad, sold extensively 
outside of its intended target market, distributed by distributors who lack the necessary 
knowledge, or any combinations of these. However, we found a clear consensus during our 
interviews that the new authority will have limited effect on the mutual fund market. Before 
listing a fund in Sweden, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority must give their 
approval. If the regulator then in a later stage would ban an already listed mutual fund they 
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would admit to being wrong first place, which the respondents deem as unlikely due to the 
loss of prestige, as seen in the quote,   
“I find it hard to believe that the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority are going to stop 
mutual funds. You must remember that the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority approves 
the fund rules, the rules of how a fund is designed. First, they would find the fund suitable and 
reasonable for savers and then in a second stage stop its distribution. I find this difficult to 
imagine. It is structured products the regulators are after.”  
-    Compliance Officer, Fund Company 
Once again, the respondents think that MiFID II will have a bigger effect on the assortment of 
complex products which may not fit the needs of the mainstream retail client, and have a 
history of being miss-sold.  
5.5 Educational Requirements 
The MiFID II framework aims to reduce the information asymmetry between financial 
advisors and investors, which requires the advisors to be able to explain the products to the 
investors. According to the industry representatives, an advisor’s knowledge needs to meet a 
higher requirement than before to become MiFID II compliant. In a post-MiFID environment, 
every advisor needs to sustain enough knowledge to explain how the products in their 
assortment work, what risks the product exposes the investor to, what tax-effects the product 
brings, how the product’s payment is managed, and what the accumulated costs under the 
product’s lifetime are under different scenarios. To make sure that the sold product is the most 
suitable product for the client, the advisor must also have enough knowledge about the 
product he/she does not sell. As an effect of this, today’s educational requirement will become 
stricter. To fulfil the stricter educational requirements, SwedSec the license needed to give 
financial advice in Sweden, will be upgraded by the yearly knowledge control, making 
advisors passing the test MiFID II compliant.  
5.6 The Uninterested Retail Investor 
Many of the regulatory effects presented in this chapter increases transparency which enables 
retail investors to collect more information to put pressure on their advisors. However, 
according to the respondents, most retail investors are neither interested in financial markets 
nor savings related matters or as one respondent put it,  
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“People, in general, do not understand basic finance and have a highly-limited interest for 
finance related issues.” 
-    Chief Compliance Officer, Fund Company 
Many respondents consider this general lack of interest in finance, and other savings related 
issues, as a problematic area since it has made some of the actors on the Swedish market 
comfortable in their situation since they have attracted retail investors anyhow. Which advisor 
retail investors choose is mainly driven by which bank they are a customer in since retail 
investor, in general, does not pay much attention to finance related issues. According to the 
respondents, this also decides which manufacturer they utilise since the banks typically 
promote their own funds first and foremost. On the other hand, an advantage, brought up by 
the respondents, with this system is that the bank can consider the investor’s entire life 
situation and recommend whether it is better to invest or pay down the mortgage. The banks 
can use this to their advantage by building a long-term relation with the client. In the future, 
many respondents expect the long-term relation to be of even higher importance to easier 
motivate the more apparent costs the new regulatory regime brings. 
 
In the Netherlands and the UK, advisors have been unable to motivate their costs, and retail 
investors have been observed to be unwilling to pay for financial advice. If the experience of 
the Netherlands and the UK holds true in Sweden as well, MiFID II risks leaving retail 
investors with less advice than today when the cost of counsel becomes more apparent to 
investors. Many respondents fear that this effect will be particularly pronounced among non-
affluent clients because it might be hard for an advisor to motivate each cost charged to 
individuals with limited capital. Wealthy investors on the other hand, may be more willing to 
bear the costs since they tend to have a better understanding of the value the advisor creates. 
Since this might leave individuals with the greatest need of financial advice with least access 
to advisors, the respondents consider this effect to be one of the major drawbacks of MiFID 
II. However, the respondents also mentioned that, due to their general lack of interest in 
financial issues, most retail investors lack the interest to assimilate the information about 
costs. Thus, they might continue to evaluate the funds based on their performance just as 
today. The media was brought up as a potential counterforce to this negligence by the 
respondents. When the transparency increases, the media is likely to scrutinise the cost of 
advice and the system of kickbacks in detail as seen in the quote,  
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“I believe this (kickbacks and product governance), will attract much attention in the media 
and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority will go out and control this to put the 
spotlight on it. I do not believe that any bank wants to attract negative press.” 
-    Senior Consultant, Consultancy Firm 
On the other hand, as one respondent pointed out, only a fraction of the population is likely to 
act after negative media coverage,  
“Studies have shown that 80% of the population do not care what the press writes, 20% 
cares, and only half of the 20% actually take action.” 
-    Chief Compliance Officer, Fund Company 
Due to the increased transparency MiFID II brings, the respondents expect retail investors to 
evaluate their advisor more than today, forcing advisors to prove their value. As of now, most 
retail investors assess their funds by their performance rather than how much extra value they 
get for the fees paid according to the respondents. When retail investors get more information, 
the respondents think that the banks must improve their offering in the future and that it will 
be even more important to take a holistic overview of the client’s needs and make sure to 
focus on one’s fiduciary duty as an advisor in the future. However, many respondents pointed 
out that this is a process which most banks have tried to adopt for many years and is not new 
with MiFID II.      
6. Analysis and Discussion 
Since most actors will still be able to accept kickbacks, MiFID II will have a limited direct 
effect on the conflict of interests caused by the difference in margins and kickbacks among 
products. However, MiFID II will still affect the business model indirectly and the principal-
agent problems in financial advice will be affected in many ways. When analysing the 
changes MiFID II will bring, it is important to keep in mind that many of the trends MiFID II 
will spur are likely to have happened anyway. In the following chapter, we analyse our 
interview results and what they will imply for the principal-agent relationship based on the 
theories presented in chapter three. The analysis is divided into four parts, where we analyse 
our interview results from the perspective of information asymmetries, adverse selection, and 
moral hazard. Finally, we discuss whether an outright prohibition of commissions would have 
been better regarding the principal-agent problems or not. 
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6.1 Information Asymmetries 
Ross (1973) described that information asymmetries is one of the key concerns in principal-
agent problems. By mitigating the information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent, principal-agent problems can be reduced (Ross, 1973). From our interview results, we 
have identified two categories that will reduce the information asymmetry in financial 
advisory, increased transparency in general, and increased information requirements regarding 
complex products.   
6.1.1 Transparency 
Our interview results show that MiFID II will impose stricter transparency requirement on 
distributors of financial products. The disclosed information must include the cost of advice, 
the cost of the product, the kickbacks received for the distribution, and the sum of the total 
cost. The increased information provided to retail investors will probably have a significant 
impact on the principal-agent problems since it reduces the information asymmetry. By 
forcing distributors to disclose this information, the regulators will reduce the information 
advantage which advisors currently hold (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008). MiFID I has already 
imposed disclosure requirements but MiFID II will make these requirements stricter. 
According to our respondents, an important change with MiFID II is that the regulation 
requires that retail investors understand the disclosed information. By reducing the 
information advantage (Ross, 1983) currently held by the advisors, the regulator makes it 
easier for retail investors to evaluate the performance of their advisor and if the product is 
worth the price (Peck, 2011), thereby putting pressure on financial advisors to prove their 
worth.  
According to the respondents, the dominant position of the universal banks on the Swedish 
market has made it a natural choice for retail investors to invest at the banks. Because of their 
historically strong position, the banks might have been comfortable in their position, which 
have reduced their need to improve their offering. Since competition reduces principal-agent 
problems (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012), the banks’ dominance might have spurred agency 
conflicts due to the lack of competition. With the increased fee transparency MiFID II brings, 
retail investors might put more pressure on their advisor to prove their value. By forcing the 
advisors to prove their value, the increased transparency might improve the quality of advice 
and increase the pressure on manufacturers to produce good products relative to their price. 
The principal-agent problems can thereby be reduced by increased competition, which is in 
line with Nickel (1996). However, this effect might be dampened by the general lack of 
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interest for financial issues among retail investors as reported in our interview results, and the 
relatively expensive monitoring (Golec, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, 
several respondents say that the media is likely to take an interest in this additional 
information. In the new regime, the media can serve as an important monitoring mechanism 
by informing retail investors about the costs and kickbacks (Dyck, Volchkova, & Zingales, 
2008). By informing the public about the fees and kickbacks associated with financial advice, 
the media can mount pressure on financial advisors to prove their worth, in line with Inderst 
and Ottaviani (2012). Thereby, advisors can be forced to deliver the best product to their 
clients to avoid negative press, which will limit the adverse selection problem described by 
Akerlof (1970). Having that said, the increased disclosure requirements also pose the question 
if retail clients will be able to absorb all the information or if it will make retail investors 
unable to absorb other, pay-off relevant facts (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012).   
If commissions and kickbacks are scrutinised in mainstream media, there is a risk that 
vertically integrated distributors will limit their supply of investment products to their own 
products to avoid critical questions by the press (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012). This would not 
solve the principal-agent problem but make them internal rather than external (Ibid). 
However, MiFID II has several measures to manage such problems. First, the advisor must 
have a process in place where they can motivate why a recommended product is the most 
suitable for the client, which many actors already have had in place for many years as pointed 
out by three of the respondents. Second, the regulation enables kickbacks to be received only 
if the advisor can prove that the kickback enhances the quality of the service. As the 
respondents pointed out, a broad product offering is one of the examples of quality 
enhancement mentioned by the regulator, which could incentivise integrated distributors to 
include third-party products in their offering. Finally, MiFID II requires advisors to explain on 
which grounds their advice is non-independent, which together with increased transparency 
makes it possible for the client to identify even the internal potential conflict of interests 
(Peck, 2011). Thus, a situation in where the retail investors are unaware of the internal 
problems, as Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) feared, can be mitigated. However, once again it is 
up to the clients to act based on the information and to understand that the kickback might be 
detrimental to their return. The dependence on clients to act is a limit to transparency due to 
the generally uninformed retail investor (Campbell et al., 2011) and the cost of monitoring 
(Golec, 1992). 
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6.1.2 Complex Products 
As the respondents pointed out, complex products in general, and structured products in 
particular, have been a problematic area in the industry since many fraudulent actors have 
maltreated them. By MiFID II these problems will be mitigated in several ways. First, by 
requiring that the client must understand the product the regulator decreases the information 
asymmetry described by Ross (1983) and thereby the retail investor’s information 
disadvantage, which is beneficial for the investor. By obtaining more information before 
purchasing the product, retail investors can make sure that the product is suitable for them, 
based on their needs, which reduces the adverse selection problem. The problem is reduced 
since the adverse selection problems occur when the buyer can evaluate the product only after 
a purchase is made (Akerlof, 1970). However, due to the lack of financial literacy among 
retail investors (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008), many respondents fear it will be hard for an 
advisor to explain a complex product in a meeting with limited time. The challenge of 
explaining a security to a retail investor might limit the available universe of securities for the 
investor, which is a potential drawback to regulation (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2012). Second, the 
increased price transparency will make the clients aware of the total cost of a structured 
product. Due to the complexity of the products, and retail investors’ lack of financial 
knowledge (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008), it seems likely that retail clients are unaware of 
complex products total cost today. Thus, by increasing the fee transparency, MiFID II enable 
retail investors to put more pressure on distributors and manufacturers to motivate why the 
product is worth its price since retail investors’ cost of monitoring decrease through disclosure 
(Peck, 2011). On the other hand, this effect might not be as big as it maybe should be due to 
the lack of interest for financial issues among retail investors as the respondents brought up 
during the interviews. 
6.2 Adverse Selection 
Adverse selection is one of the most famous concepts in economics. According to Akerlof 
(1970), adverse selection problems causes only non-optimal products to be offered on the 
market.  Out of the concepts in the interview results, we have isolated three concepts that will 
reduce the adverse selection currently present in financial advisory. First, by spurring the 
development of new segments in financial advisory, MiFID II will decrease the adverse 
selection problem through competition. Second, the regulation imposes more stringent 
product governance requirements and increases the administrative requirements when 
products are sold outside of its intended target market, which incentivises the distributor to 
Bachelor Thesis Spring 2017 Johansson, Sebastian 
  Sundén, Johan 
39 
stay within the target market. Finally, by giving the regulators an increased mandate to ban 
inappropriate and maltreated products, MiFID II might improve both the regulatory and 
internal monitoring. The three concepts and their effects on the adverse selection problem are 
discussed in more detail below.  
6.2.1 New Segments 
The industry representatives are convinced that the new regime will spur independent 
financial advisors and robo-advisors to increase their presence on the Swedish market, at least 
in the long run. If they can be truly independent, we believe that they can provide a valuable 
mitigation of the principal-agent problem. The business model of independent financial 
advisors is designed as the Spotify analogy presented in the beginning of the previous chapter. 
According to one of our respondents, this business model would provide fair structures 
without any inherent conflict of interests. However, independent advisors are associated with 
other agency conflicts. If they are not monitored properly, or in any other way incentivised, 
they have no incentive to provide return generating information to the investor’s portfolio 
(Golec, 1992). To mitigate this problem, we believe competition will play a significant role. 
Based on the experience from the Netherlands and the UK, mostly affluent individuals will be 
willing to pay for independent advice. Wealthy individuals should have more incentive to 
monitor their advisors since they have more capital to invest, considering that the reason why 
retail investors in general does not monitor their advisor more closely is the relative cost 
(Ibid). Thus, affluent investors are more likely to benchmark their advisor to other advisors, 
which serves as an important mechanism to mitigate agency problems (Ross, 1973). However, 
a problem many respondents fear with this business model is that it might leave the 
individuals with the greatest need of advice with less advice than wealthy investors which 
reaps the benefits of the increased transparency. 
Due to the unwillingness among retail investors to pay for financial advice, as seen in the 
Netherlands and the UK, most respondents believe that robo-advisors will increase their 
market share. Robo-advisors typically use Exchange Traded Funds to allocate the committed 
capital, which in general is substantially cheaper than equity funds (Poterba & Shoven, 2002). 
Since investor return is negatively correlated with a fund’s expense ratio (Mahoney, 2004), 
we are convinced that this will be in the best interest of investors. This development is 
contingent on retail investors leaving the safe harbour of their retail bank and use the service 
available. If they do so, they will challenge the dominant players to change their advice model 
to focus on only the best active funds and the cheapest passive funds by increasing the 
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competition (Nickel, 1996; Ross, 1973). Thereby, today’s adverse selection problem can be 
reduced through increased competition caused by the new segments.  
6.2.2 Product Governance 
MiFID II will bring stricter requirements for product governance. The regulation forces 
product manufacturers to identify a target market early in the development process of new 
products and to distribute this information to the distributors. These more stringent 
requirements will affect different product manufacturers differently. Many fund companies 
already fulfil these requirements due to the UCITS-regulation. Furthermore, UCITS-funds are 
directed to a broad target market, which is convenient to identify. Producers of complex 
products on the other hand, will most likely be more affected by this new regulation according 
to the respondents. Due to their risk, and pay-off profile, complex products have a more 
limited target market than UCITS-funds. Even though many of the serious actors have 
processes to identify a target market already, the increased regulation will require more 
documentation from the manufacturer to both the regulator and the distributor. The more 
stringent product governance regulation will also affect financial advisors. After the 
implementation of MiFID II, advisors must be able to prove that a product fits the retail 
investor’s needs, objectives, and characteristics. When advising a retail investor to purchase a 
product to which the investor is not within the intended target market, the advisor must also 
argue why the product is a better choice than other products, to which the retail investor is 
within the target market.  
By this process, the regulators will have an increased opportunity to monitor the advisors to 
make sure that the given advice is in the clients’ best interest. Thus, the efficiency of the 
regulatory monitoring is likely to increase, which should reduce the principal-agent problems 
associated with these products (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, since documentation is time-consuming and costly, by increasing the 
administrative requirements when stepping outside of the target market the regulator 
incentivises the advisors to stay within the target market. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
described, alignment of interest is an efficient method to ensure that the agent undertakes 
actions desired by the principal. Together, these effect is likely to decrease the adverse 
selection problem that sometimes occurs when an advisor advises retail investors to purchase, 
expensive, complex products which are not suitable for the investor. On the other hand, by 
incentivising the advisor to only advise the clients to buy products to which the investor is 
within the intended target market, the regulator risks to limit the available universe of 
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securities to retail investors. As stated by some of our respondents, sometimes products, to 
which the retail investor is outside of the target market, would be a suitable part of the 
investor’s portfolio. Due to the administrative requirements, the advisors might avoid these all 
together. Thereby, the regulation risks to create a new adverse selection problem where 
suitable products are not offered to retail investors due to the administrative burden, which is 
a drawback to the regulation as Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) warned for.  
Several respondents forecast the increased transparency to attract media attention if any actor 
comes to manage the target market insufficiently. Due to the reputational concern among the 
advisors, this will complement the monitoring of the regulator (Dyck, Volchkova, & Zingales, 
2008), further underlining the importance of staying within the target market. As mentioned 
above, staying within the target market is in many situations within the retail investors’ best 
interest but the advisors must also be competent enough to see when it is suitable for the 
investor to purchase a product which is not meant primarily for retail investors with the 
investor’s characteristics. Thus, there is a risk that the media will target the wrong cases as 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) pointed out. This might cause advisors to stay within the target 
market even when it is suitable to recommend another product. However, according to our 
respondents, the increased product governance is most likely to be in the clients’ best interest 
in the long run.      
6.2.3 Banning Products 
Since MiFID II enables regulators to ban outright bad products and products which have been 
sold outside of the target market to a large extent, the rules concerning the banning of 
products is closely related to the product governance regulation. On paper, this will increase 
the possibility of regulators to intervene by stopping products they find inappropriate for the 
market. In reality, the respondents expect this effect to be limited. Most fund companies on 
the Swedish market manufacturers already heavily regulated UCITS-funds which must be 
approved by the regulator before being listed on the market. Furthermore, UCITS-funds are, 
according to the respondents, aimed for a broad range of investors which makes it unlikely 
that they will be banned due to too much sales outside of the target market. Thus, the effect of 
the regulatory pressure, as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) brought up as an important mechanism 
to mitigate the principal-agent problem is, in this context, expected to be quite small. On the 
other hand, the regulatory pressure might be tougher for products not covered by the UCITS-
framework, such as structured products, which, according to the respondents, have been 
maltreated to a greater extent. A ban of the products is likely to be costly for the manufacture, 
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both in terms of reputational and direct revenue losses. Since banning products mainly affects 
the products manufacturers the rules incentivise the manufacturers to make sure they provide 
the distributor with the necessary information and that the distributors do not maltreat the 
products. Thereby, it can improve the monitoring of distributors, which is an important tool to 
reduce principal-agent problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
6.3 Moral Hazard 
Since the agent and the principal have different utility functions, the problem of moral hazard 
occurs (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). Moral hazard problems occur when the agent undertakes 
action in his best interest at the principal’s expense. Based on our interview results, moral 
hazards are mainly present in financial advisory when it comes to discretionary mandates and 
the distribution of complex products. By MiFID II, new policies regarding the remuneration 
for distribution of complex products will be imposed and kickbacks will be prohibited in 
discretionary mandates. In the following section MiFID II’s impact on the moral hazards 
currently present in these contexts is discussed in more detail.  
6.3.1 Remuneration of Complex Products 
As shown in the interview results, distributors of complex product will no longer be allowed 
to receive compensation for distribution of complex products upfront. The change in the 
remuneration policies for distribution of complex products is likely to have a positive effect 
on the moral hazard problem associated with these products. By forcing distributors to be 
remunerated throughout the lifespan of the product, the regulators will remove the incentive 
distributors currently hold to sell new complex products as distributors now will earn as much 
from letting the old product sit with the retail investor until maturity. Per this regulation, the 
regulator aligns the interest of the advisor and the client, thereby the regulators mitigate the 
moral hazard associated with structured products (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, this 
change is likely to leave the clients better off since they are more likely to keep the products 
until maturity and thus avoid several fees. 
6.3.2 Discretionary Mandates 
Until the implementation of MiFID II the 3rd of January 2018, financial advisors executing 
discretionary mandates can collect the kickbacks generated by products bought on their 
investors’ behalf. Until then advisors with a discretionary mandate are stuck the multitasking 
problem as Inderst and Ottaviani (2009) described. The multitasking problem occurs since 
advisors maximise their own revenue by choosing the products that generates the highest 
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kickback while simultaneously having a fiduciary responsibility to the investor. The 
conflicting interests creates a clear case for a moral hazard (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
MiFID II will prohibit advisors from receiving and keeping kickbacks in discretionary 
mandates, meaning that advisors can either chose to not accept kickbacks or take kickbacks 
but pass them on to their clients. Thereby, discretionary mandates will no longer be exposed 
to the moral hazard described above since the interest divergence is mitigated (Thomsen & 
Conyon, 2012). On the other hand, advisors with discretionary mandates will lose a part of 
their revenue stream. According to some of the respondents, the lost revenue can be replaced 
in two ways, either the advisor increases the price of their service, or promotes more of their 
own products. Due to the challenge of raising the price and the dominance by vertically 
integrated actors on Swedish scene, the prohibition of kickbacks in discretionary mandates 
might cause the internal moral hazard problem to increase. This increase occurs because the 
difference in profit margin between internal and external products increases when external 
manufacturers no can longer compensate the distributors through a kickback. Therefore, the 
advisors have incentives to select as much internal products as possible, leaving the advisor in 
a multitasking problem once again (Inderst & Ottaviani, 2009).  
Since the advisor’s interest still is not perfectly aligned with the retail investors’ after MiFID 
II we see a risk that the regulation, on one hand, will remove the external moral hazard but on 
the other hand, worsen the internal problem in discretionary mandates due to the tendency to 
focus more on internal products (Golec, 1992). By reducing the advisor’s incentive to look for 
investments outside of the internal assortment the regulator risks to limit the universe of 
available products in discretionary mandates. The reduced universe of securities might cause 
retail clients to miss out on decent investment opportunities which can be classified as an 
agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, there is a risk for interest divergence, and 
therefore a moral hazard is still present in discretionary mandates (Thomsen & Conyon, 
2012).    
A potential mitigation of the internal moral hazard is the mandatory disclosure of 
independence or non-independence. Since retail investors choosing a discretionary mandate is 
typically in the wealthier spectrum of investors (Picardo, 2017), they have a stronger incentive 
to monitor the advisor than ordinary retail investors considering that the why reason investors 
do not monitor their advisor is their limited wealth (Golec, 1992). By disclosing the non-
independence to the client, the advisor reduces the information asymmetry (Inderst & 
Ottaviani, 2012) and makes it possible for the client to realise that the advice might be biased 
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(Peck, 2011). Thus, the client might require the advisor to follow a routine that ensures the 
best possible portfolio allocation for the client, which is demanded by the regulator as well, 
and therefore increases the monitoring (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  
6.4 Would an Outright Prohibition of Commissions Have Been Better?  
By following the Netherlands and the UK and prohibit commissions, the regulator would have 
eliminated the problem of advice given based on how much kickback each product generates 
altogether. However, these markets, especially the UK, consist of more independent financial 
advisors that act on a standalone basis compared to Swedish market which is dominated by 
vertically integrated actors.  
Thus, by outright prohibiting kickbacks, as pointed out by the respondents, the regulators 
would have risked a situation where the vertically integrated players sell only their own 
products and thereby limiting the universe of securities available at each distributor (Inderst & 
Ottaviani, 2012). By banning kickbacks altogether, the regulators would have risked 
decreasing market competition since many standalone product manufacturers are dependent 
on the banks to distribute their products. That is not an optimal scenario considering that 
competition reduces principal-agent problems (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). The discussion 
above implies that a prohibition of kickbacks would have eliminated the external principal-
agent problem but risked increasing the internal principal-agent problem. However, it is also 
worth noticing that, according to the respondents, most of the vertically integrated actors 
already promotes their own products first and foremost.  
Additionally, one respondent argued that a prohibition of kickbacks could have spurred the 
development of independent financial advisors acting as the Spotify of financial advisory with 
associated benefits to the clients. On the other hand, the experience from the Netherlands and 
the UK tell us that many, non-affluent, retail investors might have stopped seeking advice if 
they were forced to pay upfront for advice. Not seeking advice might be more detrimental 
than the current system for retail investors since no advice might cause them to keep more 
capital on savings accounts rather than on the market, causing them to lose the opportunity to 
gain the market risk premium. However, it is possible that we will see this effect already with 
MiFID II due to the new fee transparency. At such it is difficult to tell whether a prohibition 
of kickbacks would have been better than the chosen way in MiFID II for retail investors or 
not. However, we argue that MiFID II took a proper first step, and leave the opportunity to 
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prohibit kickbacks open for future regulation if the evaluation of MiFID II should prove it 
necessary.   
7. Conclusion 
This thesis was written with the purpose to investigate how MiFID II may affect the business 
model of financial advisors and what this change might imply for the principal-agent 
relationship in financial advisory. By interviewing a broad range of markets actors, we have 
found that MiFID II is expected to have a significant impact on the market for financial 
advice, but maybe not as significant as we first thought when we started to write this thesis. 
Due to the opportunity to continue to receive kickbacks as a non-independent actor, the 
business model of financial advisors will most likely be stable, at least in the short run 
according to the respondents. This means no direct change for the currently inherent 
principal-agent relationship within financial advisory. However, due to the increased 
transparency requirements imposed by MiFID II, retail investors will probably be in a better 
position to evaluate their advisor since their monitoring cost decrease when the advisors are 
forced to disclose more information. In our interviews, we have found that many respondents 
expect the media to scrutinise the new details carefully. Since the media plays an important 
part in the monitoring of the agent, we expect this to mount pressure on the advisors to put 
their clients’ interest first. On the other hand, the increased information might also make retail 
investors unable to absorb all the information, causing them to miss out on prudent investment 
opportunities.  
The distribution of complex products is an area which MiFID II is expected to influence more 
directly. In the analysis we have identified three, main, changes that MiFID II will bring that 
are likely to change the principal-agent problems associated with these products. First, by 
increasing the clients’ understanding of the products, the regulator enables retail investors to 
assess whether the product is a good fit for them based on their needs, and if the product is 
worth its price, in a more convenient way. Second, by requiring a defined target market, the 
distributors’ distribution opportunities will probably be more limited than today. Even though 
distributors post MiFID II will still have the opportunity to distribute complex products 
outside of the intended target market, it requires more, costly, documentation which should 
incentivise distributors to stay within the product’s intended target market. Finally, by forcing 
distributors of complex products to receive their remuneration throughout the product’s 
lifespan, rather than up-front as of today, regulators will hopefully mitigate the incentive 
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distributors currently hold to sell as many new complex products as possible. Taken together, 
these regulatory changes will most likely decrease the principal-agent problems currently 
associated with these products. Due to the maltreatment of these products in the past, as 
pointed out by the respondents, this is something we deem as very positive. 
While MiFID II will probably decrease the principal-agent problems associated with complex 
products, we expect it to be more of a double-edged sword when it comes to discretionary 
mandates. By prohibiting advisors from collecting kickbacks in discretionary mandates, 
MiFID II is likely to remove the incentive the advisor currently holds to base the investment 
decision on how much kickback each product generates. However, by banning kickbacks, the 
difference in profit margin between internal and external products will increase, which one 
respondent mentioned might cause advisors to focus more on internally produced products. 
This negative effect of the regulation might be somewhat mitigated since investors who uses 
discretionary mandates are typically wealthier than ordinary retail investors, increasing the 
chance that they will monitor their advisor. 
In the long-run, the respondents expect that MiFID II will spur the growth of independent 
financial advisors on the Swedish market. If this happens, it might fundamentally change the 
principal-agent relationship between financial advisors and retail investors. This system 
would keep the present principal-agent problem at a minimum because many of the current 
conflicts of interest are mitigated in such a setting. The conflicts of interest are mitigated since 
independent advisors must consider securities from the whole market universe, charge the 
client directly for the advice, and neither manufacture any products nor accept kickbacks. If 
independent advisors establish themselves on the Swedish market to a large degree, already 
established actors might be forced to change their business model accordingly as well. 
However, since retail investors in general are slow movers and unwilling to pay for financial 
advice, a potential drawback to independent financial advisors might be that only wealthy 
retail investors find it worth to pay for. Thus, leaving non-affluent clients without access to 
advice and thereby possibly worse off than before. To summarise we, and the respondents, 
expects the business model of financial advisors to be stable in the short-run while we expect 
the principal-agent problem in financial advisory to decrease by MiFID II through the 
increased transparency requirements.   
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8. Proposals for Further Research 
Based on what has happened in the Netherlands and the UK many of our respondents have 
hypothesised that the accessibility of financial advice might decrease in Sweden. This is due 
to the increased fee transparency MiFID II will bring, which will make retail investors more 
aware of the cost of financial advice. An interesting research question is thus, whether 
financial advice, as of today with all its flaws, is better than no advice at all.   
Furthermore, MiFID II is a regulation which will impact far more areas than just financial 
advice as we have covered in this thesis. Another interesting research question is therefore 
how the increased transparency on the bond market and new requirements for block trades 
will affect trading patterns and market efficiency. 
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Appendix 
Interview List 
Account Manager, Third Party Distribution, Niche Bank     18-04-2017 
Chief Executive Officer, Vertically Integrated Fund Company   07-04-2017 
Chief Compliance Officer, Fund Company      07-04-2017 
Compliance Officer, Fund Company       06-04-2017 
Consultant, Consultancy Firm       07-04-2017 
Consultant, Consultancy Firm       07-04-2017 
Consultant, Consultancy Firm       08-05-2017 
Fund Manager, Fund Company       06-04-2017 
Group Responsible MiFID II, Major Universal Bank in Sweden   04-04-2017 
Deputy General Counsel, Industry Association     18-04-2017 
Director Risk Advisory, Consultancy Firm      30-03-2017 
Head of Asset Allocation & Products, Major Universal Bank in Sweden  24-04-2017 
Head of Business Development, Nordic Investment Bank    06-04-2017 
Head of Fund Products, Vertically Integrated Fund Company   05-04-2017 
Head of Private Banking Advisory, Nordic Investment Bank   06-04-2017 
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Interview Sheet - MiFID II and the Nordic Fund Market 
1. Which actors (integrated, distributors, Asset Managers, White labelling) exists on the 
market and how influential is each actor?  
2. The choice of being classified as independent or non-independent 
a. What are the pros and cons with each alternative? 
b. What choice do you think the different actors will make and why? 
3. Competitive landscape 
i. Which are the key advantages today and how will they change by the 
new regulation? 
b. Strategy 
i. How will the offering to clients change? 
1. How will the actors motivate the different costs that they know 
will be forced to make the client aware of?  
2. How will the regulation affect the popularity of ETFs? 
3. By MiFID II regulators will have more authority to cancel 
products from the market, what will be the effect of this? 
4. Which effect will the increased requirements of product 
governance get? 
ii. Will the supply of funds increase or decrease? 
c. Fees 
i. How will the payment be designed? 
1. Will the cost of advice be moved to the product? 
2. What will happen to the total fee paid by consumers? 
d. Increased costs 
i. Per MiFID II the regulators will force asset managers to move trading, 
i.e. block-trades, to regulated markets which might increase the costs  
1. Higher membership fee on the exchanges? 
2. Higher price impact? 
ii. What effects will the increased costs of equity research get?  
iii. How will asset managers compensate themselves for these cots? 
1. Higher AuM fee? 
2. Trade in fewer and more liquid shares? 
iv. Information requirements 
1. How will this be managed? 
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2. Through new investments or existing systems?  
v. Do increased costs induce a shift in terms of which clients advisors 
target? 
1. Will the increased costs cause the actors to focus more on 
affluent individuals? 
a. What will happen with an average individual’s access to 
financial advice and products? 
e. Out of the actors we talked about in the first question, which will be benefited 
and which will suffer from the regulation? 
4. Effects of MiFID II  
a. Will the regulation cause consolidation?  
i. If yes, where in the value chain (horizontally or vertically)?  
b. Will the new regulation cause new, international, players to enter the Nordic 
fund market?  
i. Do they possess economies of scale that becomes more attractive when 
the clients’ awareness about the cost increases?  
 
